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Abstract 
The long-run evolution of rent sharing is empirically studied. Based upon a 
comprehensive and harmonized panel of the top 300 publicly quoted British 
companies over thirty five years, the paper reports evidence of a significant fall over 
time in the extent to which firms share rents with workers. It confirms that companies 
do share their profits with employees, but at much smaller scale today than they did 
during the 1980s and 1990s. This is a robust finding, corroborated with industry-level 
analysis for the US and EU. The decline in rent sharing is coincident with the rise of 
product market power that has occurred as worker bargaining power has dropped. 
Although firms with more market power previously shared more of their profits, they 
experienced a stronger fall in rent sharing after 2000. 
 
Keywords: Rent sharing; Inclusive growth.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 Stagnating real wages and falling labour shares across developed economies 
have stimulated a renewed interest in the question of how, and to what extent, rents 
are shared with labour (Krueger, 1999; Gollin, 2002; Fleck et al., 2011; Pessoa and 
Van Reenen 2013; 2014; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Stansbury and Summers, 
2017; Bridgman, 2017). When workers receive less from what they produce, and rents 
are re-directed towards concentrated capital, inequalities rise as economic growth is 
no longer inclusive (Piketty, 2014).  
 The recent literature initially tended to focus on the macro- or sectoral-level 
determinants of labour share, highlighting the influence of technology (Acemoglu, 
2003a, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Lawrence, 2015), trade (Autor et al., 2014; 
2016) and institutions (Acemoglu, 2003b). However, since the wage-setting process 
is the domain of companies, an increasing number of studies have turned their 
attention to firms (Card et al. 2018). Several authors connect falling firm labour share 
with growing market concentration and the emergence of ‘superstar’ companies (Autor 
et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Adrjan, 2018). The 
question is why more market power translates into a lower labour share? A classic 
account is that workers lose bargaining power, and therefore reduced rent sharing 
(Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990). However, and at least in part owing to a lack of data, 
the reality is that little is known about long-run changes in rent sharing. 
 This paper aims to redress this by looking at the long-run evolution of rent 
sharing among UK-domiciled companies. In a perfectly competitive labour market 
there should be no relationship between firm-level wages and productivity, because 
firms take market wages as given. The extensive empirical literature of the past, 
however, consistently showed there to be a positive effect of firm rents on average 
worker compensation (e.g. Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990; Van Reenen, 1996). This is 
also the case in the newer revival of interest in rent sharing (e.g. Card et al., 2018; 
Kline et al., 2018). The most common explanation relates this effect to the bargaining 
power of workers, which allows them to claim a portion of a firm’s rents. Knowing how 
rent sharing has evolved over time can therefore help understand changes in the 
position of workers within companies and shed light on the mechanisms behind the 
fall in the labour share.  
 To examine the long run shifts, the primary analysis is based upon the 
construction of a comprehensive and consistent panel of the top 300 companies by 
market capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1983 until 2016. Firm-
level information was manually collected from annual reports and combined with 
various existing databases. The construction of the dataset ensures the coverage of 
the entire economy and limits the sample selection bias. Overall, the panel consists of 
843 firms, which together employ over 7 million workers worldwide (2016) and 
constitute around 95% of total UK market capitalization. The data in the sample refers 
to the global operations of UK-domiciled companies. The analysis is complemented 
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through the study of data on domestic UK operations, from a panel of UK 
manufacturing companies from the Annual Respondents Database and the Annual 
Business Survey. 
 The empirical approach draws on and extends beyond the older and newer rent 
sharing literatures. To begin with, the rent-sharing coefficient is estimated using a 
dynamic firm fixed-effect model, which controls for all time-invariant firm 
characteristics. In particular, it comes from a regression of log compensation per 
employee on contemporaneous and lagged profits per employee, and measures of 
external forces (the unemployment rate, industry-level wages, and time fixed effects). 
Potential endogeneity is dealt with by instrumenting the lagged dependent variable 
and the current and lagged profits in the first-differenced model with their lagged levels 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
 Based upon these conventional means of estimating the degree of rent sharing, 
the first result to emerge is of a positive and statistically significant rent-sharing 
parameter. Estimating over the whole sample this rent sharing elasticity is fairly 
modest in magnitude, and towards the lower end of estimates from other firm-level 
studies (Card et al., 2018). The second, more novel result concerns the time series 
evolution of rent sharing. There is a substantial fall in the long-run elasticity from 0.043 
in the period 1983-2000 to 0.012 in the period 2001-2016. The finding of a significantly 
reduced rent sharing parameter proves robust to various specification checks and 
alternative definitions of the sample. Moreover, the same result emerges for the panel 
of UK manufacturing companies, which provides data on domestic operations only. In 
addition, industry-level data for the US and for nine EU countries again show the same 
pattern. Consistent with the firm analysis, there is a strongly falling correlation between 
log compensation per employee and profits per employee for almost all countries since 
the early 2000s (EU) and the 1970-80s (US). 
 The final part of the study moves on to mechanisms. A firm-level measure of 
market power (market share) is computed and used to explore the extent to which 
companies with higher market power share more or less of their profits. First, and 
consistent with recent work (Autor et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker and 
Eeckhout, 2017; Hall, 2018)1 median market share increases among UK companies 
since 1983. Second, companies with higher market power share on average more of 
their rents than companies with low power. Third, the positive association between 
market power and rent sharing is significantly weaker in the period 2001-2016 
compared to 1983-2001. In other words, the fall in rent sharing was more pronounced 
among the companies which enjoy monopolistic markups. 
 The findings have implications for the debate on the future of labour. A decline 
in rent sharing implies growing labour market inequalities and may encourage calls for 
                                                          
1
 For an opposite view that criticises the detail of this work, see Traina (2018). Hall (2018) looks at the 
issue in a different way, computing shifts in market power from industry price/marginal cost markups (in 
similar ways to his earlier classic study of market power), concluding similarly to De Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2017) that markups have risen through time in the US, but not at quite the same rate as their 
study (where costs are measured only using accounting information on costs of goods sold).  
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a bigger role for redistributive policies. It also suggests a fundamental change in the 
competitiveness of the labour market. A weaker bargaining position of workers might 
be a result of technological change (‘robocalypse’), higher labour mobility and 
institutional change (e.g. decline in unions). Finally, companies with higher market 
power experience relatively larger falls in rent sharing, suggesting that competition 
policies should also be analysed from the labour market perspective. As these 
companies are increasingly global, one might expect these trends to become world-
wide phenomena. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly discusses the 
related theoretical and empirical literature on the links between firm rents and wages. 
Section III provides details of the data construction and presents summary statistics 
on performance and compensation in the sample. The firm-level results are presented 
in Section IV and the industry-level results in Section V. Section VI provides evidence 
for the links between market power and the fall in rent sharing. Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II. Rent Sharing 
 
II.A. Theoretical Considerations 
 
 A positive correlation between wages and profit is not a feature of a standard 
perfect competition model. Wages are given and do not depend on firm characteristics. 
If a company experiences a productivity or demand shock, it will increase employment, 
but keep wages fixed. In more realistic models, a portion of the shock is captured by 
workers in the form of higher wages. There are at least three ways this result can occur 
(Blanchflower et al., 1996). The first is a monopsonistic model with an upward sloping 
short-run labour supply curve. The second is an incentive pay model, where risk-
averse workers and firms share gains and losses. The third approach incorporates a 
wage bargaining process between workers and firms.  
 In the monopsonistic model with an upward sloping short-run labour supply 
curve, a positive correlation between wages and profits appears only in the short run 
because of a demand shock. When the economy is hit by a positive shock, companies 
move up along the supply curve, and profits will rise together with employment and 
wages. As long as the elasticity of labour demand is less than unity, profits per worker 
and wages will increase at the same time and this co-movement disappears once the 
economy reaches a new equilibrium. However, the evidence suggests that rent 
sharing is a long-run phenomenon (e.g. Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990; Blanchflower et 
al., 1996; Van Reenen, 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). 
 The incentive pay model with job contracts that share gains and losses between 
risk-averse firms and workers is characterized by equilibrium rent sharing. When effort 
is hard to monitor, but output observable (e.g. sales), it might be optimal to offer a 
piece rate pay scheme, which directly links wages with the output. Because the level 
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of output is only partially explained by a worker’s effort, one can observe a positive 
correlation between wages and productivity shocks in the short and long run (Baily, 
1974; Azariadis, 1975; Lazear, 1986; Brown, 1990). The problem with this hypothesis 
is that piece rate systems are rarely used outside very specific occupations and jobs. 
 Given the shortcoming of the two previous theories, the most widely used 
approach assumes a bargaining model over wages. Suppose employees wish to 
maximize the difference between their firm’s wages 𝑤𝑤 and the outside option 𝑤𝑤� . Let 𝜙𝜙 
denotes the bargaining power of employees. Firms maximize profits 𝜋𝜋 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦) − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 −𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤. Employees and firms engage in a Nash bargain, with a standard maximization 
problem: 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 [𝜙𝜙 ln��𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤�)�𝑤𝑤� + (1 − 𝜙𝜙)ln (𝜋𝜋)] 
 
In the event of a bargaining breakdown, the firm earns zero profits and the employees 
earn the outside option. The first-order condition with respect to wages is: 
 𝑤𝑤𝜙𝜙𝑢𝑢′(𝑤𝑤)�𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤�)�𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝜙𝜙)𝜋𝜋 = 0 
 
Using a first order Taylor approximation formula: 𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤�) ≅ 𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤) + (𝑤𝑤� − 𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢′(𝑤𝑤), one 
can rewrite the above equation to produce:  
 𝑤𝑤 ≅ � 𝜙𝜙
1 − 𝜙𝜙�𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 + 𝑤𝑤�  
 
 This equation relates the firm’s wages with the outside option, the worker’s 
bargaining power and the firm’s profits per employee. The outside option depends on 
market wages in other companies (𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜) and the unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈) – the 
probability of finding an alternative job. The insider force is profit per employee. The 
equilibrium wage can be then expressed as a function of all the above factors: 
 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜,𝑈𝑈,𝜙𝜙,𝜋𝜋,𝑤𝑤) 
 
This relationship motivates the main empirical specification described in Section IV.  
 
 
II.B. Existing Empirical Evidence 
 
 There is by now a vast literature investigating the relationship between wages 
and profits. The early studies used a panel of US manufacturing industries. Katz and 
Summers (1989) find evidence for a positive and significant correlation between 
wages and profits, with an implied rent-sharing elasticity of around 0.04. Since 
profitable industries might employ more high-skill workers, it is important to control for 
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the time-varying quality of the workforce. Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) 
supplement the industry data with measures of worker quality from the CPS and 
estimate the rent-sharing coefficient between 0.01 and 0.06. Estavao and Tevlin 
(2003) use similar data but find a much larger elasticity of 0.14 when rents are 
instrumented with demand shocks in downstream sectors. 
 An increased focus on firm-level studies arose during the 1990s after a series 
of influential papers analysing British companies. Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) use a 
panel of the UK listed firms from 1975 to 1982 and estimate the elasticity in the range 
of 0.068-0.093. In follow-up work, Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) find no 
relationship between product market power and rent-sharing. In an early attempt to 
account for the potential endogeneity problem between wages and firm performance, 
Van Reenen (1996) employs a measure of technology innovations (patents) as an 
instrument for quasi rents in a panel of large British manufacturing firms. The author 
finds that instrumenting rents more than doubles the rent-sharing elasticity, from 0.11 
to 0.29.  These findings were later confirmed by Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and 
Hildreth (1998), who report the elasticity in the range of 0.02-0.03 when rents were 
instrumented with lagged values, and much larger - around 0.17 - when instrumented 
with a measure of innovation. Similarly, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) using a panel of 
Canadian collective bargaining agreements, find a zero correlation between quasi-
rents and negotiated wages in a simple OLS regression, but a large elasticity of 0.22 
when quasi-rents are instrumented with industry import and export prices.  
 More recently there has been a revival of interest in rent sharing. The newer 
studies often exploit employee-employer matched data and document a relatively 
small elasticity of individual wages with respect to firm-level measures of rents. 
Drawing on a Portuguese panel of workers and firms, Cardoso and Portela (2009), 
Martins (2009) and Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016) find an elasticity in the range of 
0.03-0.09, even when rents are instrumented with a potential exposure to export 
shocks (Martins, 2009). Using an administrative data set from Italy, Guiso, Pistaferri 
and Schivardi (2005) and Card, Devicienti and Maida (2014) document an elasticity 
ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, with rents instrumented by firm-averages of sales and 
workers from other Italian regions (Card et al., 2014). Bagger, Christensen and 
Mortensen (2014) use Danish data to show heterogeneity in rent sharing across 
industries, with the elasticity between 0.05 and 0.13 – with trade at the upper end of 
the spectrum and transportation and communication at the lower end. Elasticities 
within the range of 0.01-0.12 are also reported in France (Margolis and Salvanes, 
2001; Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2004), Germany (Guertzgen, 2009) and Sweden (Arai, 
2003; Arai and Hayman, 2009; Carlsson, Messina and Skans, 2016). 
 The availability, and if available validity, of instrumental variables estimates in 
this literature remains a contentious issue. Studies that exploit firm-level variation in a 
plausibly exogenous instrument tend to suffer from a weak instrument problem. As a 
result, most studies instrument firm-level rents with industry-level rents. As Manning 
(2010) points out, if labour has an industry-specific component and there is a positive 
shock to industry profits, then this raises the demand for labour in a competitive model 
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and should lead to higher wages (represented by a rise in 𝑤𝑤�  in the above equation). 
In such a case, it is not clear that industry-level rents serve as a valid instrument for 
firm-level rents. In most of this paper, Arellano-Bond estimates based upon two-period 
(and before) lags to instrument are used. However, estimates using a leave-out 
industry measure as an instrument for firm-level rents are also reported, with similar 
findings emerging. 
 Maybe surprisingly, not many studies have investigated the evolution of rent 
sharing. The likely reason is the lack of a consistent firm-level panel which would be 
long enough to capture changes, that would be comprehensive enough to cover all 
sectors and that include information on compensation and profits. For instance, US 
company-level data from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Compustat goes back to the 
1960s. However only a small (and changing) subset of firms contains information on 
compensation, as disclosure of this information is not obligatory. A notable exception 
is a study by Bell and Van Reenen (2011), which uses the matched US manufacturing 
worker-industry data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) Productivity Database. The authors report an elasticity 
of around 0.05 in the period between 1964 and 1985, which falls to zero between 1986 
and 2005. Benmelech, Bergman and Kim (2018) also report a fall in the elasticity of 
wages with respect to labour productivity between 1977 and 2009 for US 
manufacturing companies.   
 Overall, the literature shows that the predictions of the perfectly competitive 
model that wages do not depend on firm’s rents is not supported in the data - a 
proportion of rents has been shared with workers. Across various countries and 
industries, the rent-sharing elasticity is usually estimated to be below 0.10, but this 
estimate tends to increase when instrumental variables are used. Due to the lack of 
data, however, very little is known about the temporal evolution of rent sharing. In the 
following sections, a novel dataset on UK-domiciled firms is used to fill this gap. 
 
 
III. Data 
 
III.A. Firm-Level Data 
 
 UK publicly listed companies have been required to report staff costs in their 
company accounts since 1983. However, the existing datasets on listed companies 
(e.g. Worldscope) have very poor coverage of the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
alternative is to use official surveys of firms, but until 1995 the surveys were either 
short lived (e.g. Cambridge DTI) or were limited to only the manufacturing sector (e.g. 
ARD). Since the existing data are not suitable for the research questions posed here, 
instead a comprehensive and consistent panel of British public companies was 
constructed by drawing from published annual reports and existing databases. 
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The top 300 companies by market capitalization listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) between 1983 and 2016 are studied. To obtain these data, several 
steps were taken. First, the universe of listed companies was obtained from the 
London Share Price Database (LSPD), which records information on all listings that 
have been traded on the London Stock Exchange since 1955. The universe of listings 
was restricted to only those domiciled in the UK and exclude investment trusts, unit 
trusts and real estate trusts, as well as secondary shares. The black lines in Figure 1 
display the total and selected number of firms listed on the LSE in the sample window 
(1983-2016). The population of companies is on average 27% smaller than the raw 
number of listings, but the two series have an almost identical evolution. Next, for 
every year between 1983 and 2017 the top 300 companies by market capitalization 
were selected, but those in the top for less than three years in total were excluded. 
Having established the list of companies, data were collected for all years (within 1983-
2016) when a company was publicly listed, even when it was outside the top 300. The 
resulting panel consists of 13,512 observations for 843 companies, which together 
employ over 7 million workers worldwide (2016) and constitute around 95% of total 
UK market capitalization. The construction of the dataset ensures coverage of the 
entire economy and limits the sample selection bias. This is of crucial importance for 
the long-run analysis given the dramatic shift of employment from manufacturing to 
service sectors over the sample period. In the remainder of the paper this panel is 
referred to as the ‘top 300’ sample. 
 The grey line in Figure 1 shows the top 300 sample size in comparison to the 
total number of companies listed on the LSE. Figure 2 decomposes the sample into 
observations that are at the top in a given year and observations outside the top (but 
are at the top in another year). By construction, the number of observations peaks in 
the middle period (1994-1998) because that period captures three types of companies: 
companies at the top in that period, companies at the top in the beginning of the time 
window (which are still alive in 1994-1998) and companies at the top in the end of the 
window (which already existed in the 1990s).  The edges of the window (e.g. 1983 or 
2016) have fewer observations as they capture fewer of those companies which were 
at the top in other years. The fluctuation in the number of companies at the top (the 
dashed line) is a result of the rule that companies must be at the top for at least three 
years to enter the sample. In particular, the dot-com bubble of 1999-2001 created a 
lot of high-valued but short-lived tech companies.  
 The LSPD contains limited information on a firm’s characteristics and accounts. 
Financial data were collected either manually from annual reports or from existing 
datasets. The main data provider is Thomson Reuters Worldscope, complemented 
with S&P Compustat, Exstat, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) ORBIS, BvD FAME and 
Cambridge DTI. Company-years were matched across the dataset using unique 
identifiers (SEDOL and ISIN) and company name. Over 1,700 company-years in the 
sample are not covered by the existing datasets, variables were manually collected 
from scans of published financial reports available at Mergent Archive and Companies 
House. 
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 When looking at more than thirty years of data, changes in the formal 
organization of companies are the norm rather than the exception. Most of the 
companies in the sample encountered some form of reorganization, merger or 
acquisition (M&A). This often leads to a discontinuous change in wages and profits 
per employee, which might introduce noise into the estimates. Whenever a company 
takes over another one and a new legal entity is created, the time series of the two 
companies are separated out and given a specific id/fixed effect for the new entity (if 
publicly listed). In many cases, however, the takeovers are relatively minor and do not 
result in substantial legal changes (except for the purchased company, which 
disappears). These cases were manually identified and a dummy variable control for 
them was incorporated into regressions.  
 The data in the ‘top 300’ sample refers to the global operations of UK-domiciled 
companies. To see whether the main results hold for domestic operations, a panel of 
UK manufacturing (production sector) companies was set up using data from Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD) for 1979 - 2008 and Annual Business Survey (ABS) for 
2008 - 2018.2 Although the companies might operate in many countries, the ARD and 
ABS focus exclusively on the UK operation. The data include all companies larger than 
250 employees3 and an annual sample of smaller ones. However, numerous 
companies with employment around the cut-off were occasionally dropping in and out 
of the main sample, and for this reason, only firms with employment larger than 300 
and for which data availability was for at least four years were considered. After these 
adjustments, the sample consists of 36,912 firm-year observations for 3,409 firms. 
 The main measure of rents is profit before tax per employee. Since profits are 
very volatile and outliers might drive the results, the approach used in Card et al. 
(2014) was followed and for every year observations with profits per employee outside 
the 1st-99th percentile range were trimmed.  
 The wage bargaining model outlined in Section II demonstrated that the wage-
setting process is a function of ‘outsider’ forces. These are accounted for by including 
the industry average wage and the nationwide unemployment rate. The data on the 
industry average wage comes from the UK files of EU-KLEMS and the unemployment 
rate comes from the ONS. For the panel of manufacturing companies from ARD and 
ABS, data on regional-level unemployment rates were matched from the Labour Force 
Survey (1979-1991) and NOMIS/LFS (1992-2016). The data on regional-level average 
hourly wages come from the New Earning Survey Panel Database (NESPD). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 ARD until 1997 has only data on companies from production sector. Since 1998 ARD and ABS cover 
the entire economy, but we only keep the production sector for consistency. 
3
 To be more precise. All firms larger than 250 are included since the survey year of 1998. Between 
1995 and 1997 all firms larger than 200 employees, and between 1980 and 1994 all firms larger than 
100 employees.   
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III.B. Industry Level Data 
 
           The analysis of industries for nine EU countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK and Spain) draws from the EU-KLEMS data. 
For the US, the data source is the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Both 
sources provide information on productivity, employment and compensation. EU-
KLEMS covers the entire economy for 28 1-digit (2-digit for manufacturing) sectors 
and the data are available since the 1990s until 2015 (coverage differs by country). 
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database is limited only to the manufacturing 
sector but provides data for 459 industries in the period from 1963 to 2011.  
 
III.C. Descriptive Statistics 
 
          Table 1 reports the top five companies based on market capitalization, 
employment and revenue for 1983, 2000 and 2016 for the top 300 UK firms. In the 
early 1980s, the UK economy was dominated by the manufacturing sector, with 
companies such as British Petroleum, General Electric Company or British American 
Tobacco making it to the top in all categories. Seventeen years later, there is a rise of 
the banking and finance (HSBC, Aviva, and Prudential), telecommunication 
(Vodafone) and retail (Tesco, Sainsbury) sectors. Within the manufacturing sector, 
pharmaceutical firms (GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca) replaced the more traditional 
electronic and machinery producers at the top. Today, the British ‘superstar’ 
companies originate in the financial, banking and business services, such as G4S, 
Compass Group - the providers of outsourced services. Interestingly, British 
Petroleum and British American Tobacco are found at the top in 1983 and 2016, which 
testifies to the continued importance of the oil and tobacco industries.  
 Table 2 and Figure 3 report the average firm size in the top 300 sample (with 
trimmed profits). A U-shaped evolution of mean employment since 1983 until today is 
seen. At the beginning of the 1980s, the average company employed over 15,000 
workers and grew until the end of the decade. After a drop to around 13,000 
employees in 1994, firm size has experienced undisrupted growth until 2016. Today 
the average company in the sample has more than 22,000 employees. However, the 
standard deviation is over twice as large as the mean, indicating a sizeable variation 
in the firm size – the smallest company in the sample has 5 employees, whereas the 
largest employs more than half a million. The time-series might be extremely volatile 
for firms with low employment, and as a robustness check the appendix Table A1 
reports results that limit the top 300 sample to companies with at least 50 employees.  
 Table 2 and Figure 4 document the evolution of mean real revenue, 
compensation and profit per employee expressed in thousands of £2016 (weighted by 
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employment). Average revenue and compensation per head grew steadily since 1983 
until the Great Recession, after which they started falling and, in 2015, they dropped 
to the levels reported in the early 2000s. The year 2016 witnessed a recovery of 
revenue and wages. Although the reported numbers refer to global operations, the 
sample mean annual compensation in 2016 is £34,400, which is close to the UK 
average for full-time workers. The mean profit per employee is more volatile. The 
positive trend between 1983 and 2011 was interrupted by the recession of 1991-92, 
the dot-com bubble of 1999-2001 and the Great Recession. Profits peaked in the years 
before and after the latter, but since 2011 they have been steadily falling.   
 
IV. Levels and Trends in Firm-Level Rent Sharing 
 
IV.A. Top 300 Companies  
 
  The theoretical considerations in Section II concluded with a formulation of the 
wage-setting process as a function of outside forces (unemployment, industry wages), 
the bargaining power of workers and profits per employee.  In particular, the equation 
for log wages was as follows: 𝑤𝑤 ≅ � 𝜙𝜙
1 − 𝜙𝜙�𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 + 𝑤𝑤�  
 
            This equation is taken as the basis for formulating and implementing 
theempirical strategy, together with introducing a set of modifications to account for 
potential endogeneity bias. First, the commonality of find long-term employment 
contracts can generate a certain amount of inertia in wage determination. This 
possibility is allowed for by inclusion of lagged wages and profits into the equation. 
Second, firm fixed-effects are included, so as to absorb time-invariant company 
characteristics affecting firm performance and wages. Finally, the model is first-
differenced, which, by construction, leads to a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). In addition, omitted time-varying 
firm characteristics might drive the correlation between wages and profits. These two 
sources of possible bias are coped with by instrumenting the lagged dependent 
variable and the current and lagged profits in the first-differenced model with their 
lagged levels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Overall, the rent-sharing elasticity is 
estimated using a dynamic firm fixed-effect model of the following form:  
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log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙log 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0
+𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where the outcome variable 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is log compensation per employee for company i, in 
industry j at time t. The variable of interest 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 is profit before tax per employee, 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 captures all time-invariant firm effects. Two strategies to control for the outside 
forces are employed. The first controls for the nationwide unemployment rate 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙, the 
1-digit industry (2-digit for manufacturing) log average wage 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 and for a polynomial 
time trend (e.g. for a quadratic, 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆1𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑡𝑡2). The second includes the log 
industry average wage and year fixed effects, which account for all nationwide time 
effects (i.e. 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖). Up to three lagged values of profits and the outside forces 
are included (e.g. as in Blanchflower et al., 1996). In addition, every regression 
includes a dummy for significant episodes of mergers and acquisitions. Since profits 
can take negative values, profits per employee are entered in levels, however, the 
reported coefficients are transformed into elasticities.  
 In the above model, the short-run (SR) elasticity is captured by the 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽0, that is, the effect of contemporaneous profits on wages. The long-run 
(LR) elasticity, for the specification with three lags of profits, is given by (𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1+ 𝛽𝛽2 +𝛽𝛽3)/(1 − 𝛼𝛼), since in the long run 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 = 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1.  
            Table 3 presents baseline estimates for the whole period 1983-2016. Columns 
1 to 4 use the unemployment rate, the average industry wages and a quadratic 
polynomial of time to account for the outside forces. Various different lag structures 
are explored across the specifications. All columns, except 4, instrument profits with 
their lagged values. The LR elasticities of pay with respect to profits are estimated 
within the range of 0.010-0.013 and the SR elasticity within the range of 0.006-0.010. 
Columns 5 to 8 use the average industry wages and year fixed effects to account for 
the outside forces. The results remain virtually the same, with the LR elasticity within 
the range of 0.011-0.013 (SR 0.006-0.009). Specifications without the instrumented 
profits (columns 4 and 8) produce a smaller elasticity of 0.006-0.007, which is likely 
due to simultaneity problems with contemporaneous profits. The effects of the outsider 
forces are consistent with the basic theory. The unemployment rate has a null or 
negative LR effect on wages, meaning that worse employment prospect create a 
downward pressure on wages. The average industry wage has a positive impact, 
indicating an upward pressure on wages, when the outside wage is growing.  
 The baseline results indicate positive and significant rent sharing among these 
UK companies. How do these estimates compare to the existing empirical studies? As 
pointed out by Card et al. (2018), rent-sharing elasticities estimated using profits 
should be multiplied by the average ratio between value-added and profits (roughly 
equal to two) in order to compare them to estimates based on value-added or revenue. 
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After this adjustment, the estimates of LR rent sharing are within the range of 0.020-
0.026, which is similar to the UK firm-level estimates from Hildreth and Oswald (1997) 
and Hildreth (1998), but below the estimates from Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) 
(0.068-0.093). They are also at the lower end of the estimates typically found using 
worker-level data, for instance, from Portugal by Card et al. (2018) (0.04-0.05) or from 
Italy by Card et al. (2014) (0.06-0.08). 
Turning to the evolution of rent sharing over time, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 
look separately at the two sub-periods: 1983-2000 and 2001-2016. According to these 
estimates, there is a marked fall in rent sharing since 1983. In the period 1983-2000 
the LR elasticity is 0.043, which is comparable to the existing estimates from that 
period (Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990; Hildreth, 1998). However, in the subsequent 
period 2001-2016, the elasticity is approximately three and half times smaller. How 
economically significant a fall is this? To assess this, Lester’s Range (Lester, 1952), 
that is the spread of wages which can be attributed to the dispersion of profits, was 
calculated.4 Assuming that the distribution of profits is four standard deviations, 
moving from the bottom to the top of the distribution of profits, increases wages by 
approximately 45% in the first period, compared to 20% in the second period. In other 
words, before 2000 almost a half of firm-level wage inequality could be attributed to 
rents, but after 2000, only one-fifth.5   
 Next, the fall in rent sharing is considered further as Columns 3 to 6 of Table 4 
report the estimates for four sub-periods: 1983-1991, 1991-2000, 2000-2009 and 
2009-2016.6 The rationale for such division is to look separately at the periods before 
and after the significant decline of unions (the early 90s) and at the period after the 
recent economic crisis (2008-2009). The rent-sharing elasticity in the first period is 
noisily measured, but large and positive at the level of 0.050. During the 1990s the 
elasticity falls to 0.035 but is strongly significant. The falling trend continues after 2000, 
when the elasticity drops to 0.016, and practically reaches zero in the decade after the 
Great Recession. A similar pattern is reported for the estimates of Lester’s Range. At 
its peak during the 1980s and early 1990’s, rent sharing can account for over a half of 
the firm-level wage inequality, while today only one-tenth.  
 Finally, the industry-level leave-out mean profits is used as an alternative 
instrument for firm-level profits. Columns 7 to 10 of Table 4 report the estimates for 
the four sub-periods. Consistent with the literature, instrumenting profits with the 
industry-level measures tends to lead to higher estimates of rent sharing (Card et al., 
                                                          
4
 Lester’s Range is defined as the rent-sharing coefficient multiplied four and by the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean of profits (Blanchflower et al., 1996).  
5
 Is the observed fall in rent sharing merely a result of attenuation bias? Table 2 reports an increasing 
number of small companies with potentially more volatile series. As an additional robustness check, in 
Table A1 we estimate the rent-sharing coefficients only for the sample of companies larger than 50 
employees. The results are practically unchanged. 
6
 Because the data start in 1983, including too many lags of independent variables in the first-period 
regression leads to noisy estimates. Therefore the number of lags is restricted to two for all 
specifications.  
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2018). The first two periods (1983-1991 and 1991-2000) have a very similar elasticity 
of 0.060-0.065 and Lester’s Range of around 63%. However, in the following two 
periods (2000-2009 and 2009-2016) there is no evidence of rent sharing.  
An additional robustness check compares the estimated changes in the rent 
sharing coefficients for nine industries, for specifications with and without instrumented 
profits by the industry-level leave-out means. Each circle in Figure 5 represents the 
estimated change in the industry-specific rent-sharing coefficient between the two 
periods 2001-2016 and 1983-2000, the size of circle marks the average (across time) 
industry share in the total value added. The X-axis is for specifications with industry-
level profits as an IV, the Y-axis without. The fitted line is very close to a 45-degrees 
line. Although instrumenting profits changes the estimated levels, Figure 5 shows that 
instrumenting does not matter for the estimated changes. 
 
 
IV.B. Manufacturing Companies 
 
 Modern companies are increasingly global, with boundaries crossing across 
not only countries, but also continents. Consequently, one should interpret the above 
results as evidence for UK-domiciled companies, since many firms in the sample have 
operations extending beyond the border. While this analysis is still informative about 
rent sharing in the British economy, it can be complemented with a similar analysis of 
domestic operations from the panel of UK manufacturing companies. The same 
methodology as previously is adopted, with exception that the outsider effects (i.e. 
average wages and unemployment) are now defined at the regional level. In particular, 
the model now becomes: 
 
log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 +�𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 log𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙�𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙 log𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where i indexes firms, r stands for region and t indicates time. The remainder of the 
notation is the same as previously.  
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the estimates for the whole period 1983-
2016. Three lags of each independent variable are included. Column 1 includes a 
second-order polynomial of time, column 2 includes year fixed effects. The LR 
elasticities of pay with respect to profits are estimated between 0.012 and 0.015, with 
the specification including year fixed effects located at the lower end of the range. 
These estimates are almost identical to those reported in Table 3 for the top 300 
sample over the same period. 
 Turning to the evolution of rent sharing, Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 look 
separately at the four sub-periods: 1983-1991, 1991-2000, 2000-2009 and 2009-2016. 
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Again there is seen to be a substantial fall in rent sharing since 1983. In the first period 
the magnitude of the rent-sharing elasticity is almost 0.070. In the following periods, 
however, the coefficient gradually falls. Between 1991 and 2000 it is 0.037, between 
2000 and 2009 it is 0.033, and finally reaches zero after 2009. 
 Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of the Lester range for the two UK firm-level 
samples. The lines show a remarkable similarity, indicating that the dramatic fall in 
rent sharing was a characteristic of the whole economy and was not unique to global 
UK-domiciled public companies or the domestic manufacturing sector. The next 
section shows that the fall in rent sharing is, in fact, also visible for EU and US 
industries. 
 
 
V. Levels and Trends in Industry-Level Rent Sharing 
 
V.A. Evidence from EU Industries 
           The firm-level data show that the rent-sharing coefficient has been falling for 
the global operations of UK-domiciled companies from all sectors, and for the domestic 
operation of UK-based manufacturing companies. In this section, industry-level data, 
which allow study of domestic operations across all sectors for the UK and other 
advanced economies, are analysed. 
 The starting point is an analysis of the EU-KLEMS industry-level data, which 
provides information on wages and rents for the same 28 industries across EU 
countries since the 1990s until 20157 (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009; Jäger, 2016). 
The UK and eight countries for which the data goes back to the early 1990s (Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Finland, France, Netherlands, and Spain) are studied. The 
evolution of rent sharing for all the pooled countries and industries comprising a panel 
of 25 years (T) of data for 28 industries (N) is considered. Of course, these data are 
“small N, large T” and therefore not feasible for Arellano-Bond estimation and, in 
general, for dynamic panel models (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, long-run changes in 
wages are regressed on long-run changes in rents measured by profits per worker: 
 
log𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − log𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 = 𝛽𝛽 �𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙� + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
 
where 𝑙𝑙 = 14 if  t = 2005  and  𝑙𝑙 = 10 if  𝑡𝑡 = 2015.  
 The outcome variable 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is log compensation per employee in industry j from 
country c at time t. The variable of interest 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is profits per employee. Country (𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) 
/ industry fixed effects (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖) are included. The time breakdown is the fourteen-year 
change 1991-2005 and the ten-year change between 2005 and 2015. In order to 
                                                          
7
 We do not include the 1970s and 1980s, as the provided numbers are estimates. 
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reduce measurement error, wages and profits for each year are smoothed and 
replaced with the three-year moving average 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 𝜋𝜋�/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 .  
 Table 6 presents the estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient for pooled 
industries and countries (the coefficient 𝛽𝛽).8 Each row displays results for separate 
periods, for instance, the first row shows the effect of the change between 1991 and 
2005 in profits per employee on the change in the same period in log wages. In the 
first period, the correlation between profits and wages, 0.0012-0.0019, is consistently 
positive and significant. It corresponds to a Lester Range of 3-5%. In the second 
period, the estimates are practically zero. Interestingly, the inclusion of industry and 
country fixed effects matters little for the estimates, suggesting that the fall of rent 
sharing cannot be explained by a shift from high to low rent-sharing sectors or country-
specific changes. 
 
V.B. Evidence from US Manufacturing 
 
           The evolution of rent sharing in the US is studied using the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry data for the period from 1963 to 2011. Although the data 
covers only the production sector, it allows us to use 459 4-digit industries and avoid 
the “small N, large T” problem. The rent-sharing elasticity is produced in a similar 
fashion as it was in the firm-level analysis by using a dynamic industry fixed-effect 
model of the following form: 
 
log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙log 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0
+𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where the outcome variable 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is log compensation per employee for manufacturing 
industry j at time t. The variable of interest 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 is profit before tax per employee 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 captures time-invariant industry effects. Outsider forces are either controlled 
for via inclusion of the log nationwide unemployment rate 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙, the log 2-digit industry 
average wage 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙9 and for a polynomial of time, or by the log industry average wage 
and year fixed effects. Up to three lagged values of profits and the outsider forces are 
incorporated. Again the model is first-differenced and lagged dependent variable and 
the current and lagged profits are instrumented with their lagged levels (Arellano and 
                                                          
8
 We also run regressions for the UK industries only and find very similar levels and evolution of the 
rent-sharing coefficients as in the pooled sample. The results are available upon request. 
9
 Regressing a variable on its group’s mean mechanically leads to a coefficient of one for the mean and 
zero for other variables. To avoid this problem, we use the 2-digit average industry wages from the 
IPUMS-CPS March files (Flood et al., 2017).  
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Bond, 1991). The level of profits per employee is used in a log-levels specification, 
however we transform the reported coefficients into elasticities.  
 Column 1 of Table 7 reports the estimates for the whole period 1963-2011 for 
specifications with three lags and year fixed effects. There is a positive and significant 
rent-sharing parameter with magnitude 0.014 and Lester’s Range of 8%. This estimate 
is, nevertheless, almost five times smaller than those reported in Blanchflower, 
Oswald and Sanfey (1996) for the shorter period between 1964 and 1985. Can this 
difference be attributed to a fall in rent sharing after 1985? To check for this possibility, 
Columns 2 to 6 of Table 7 split the sample into five periods: 1963-1974, 1974-1983, 
1983-1991, 1991-2000 and 2000-2011. Results from specifications with the log of 
average 2-digit industry wages and year fixed effects are reported. The rent-sharing 
elasticity over the first period (column 1) is 0.054, which is close to the estimates from 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996). However already in the 1970s and 1980s 
(columns 2 and 3) there is a decline to around 0.014. The two most recent periods, 
1991-2000 and 2000-2011 are marked by near-zero estimates, implying an almost 
complete lack of rent sharing in the US manufacturing sector. Lester’s Range declines 
as well, from around 17% in the first period, to around 5.5% between 1974 and 1991 
to just 2.5% since 1991. These findings are consistent with Bell and Van Reenen 
(2011), who use the same data and find no evidence for rent sharing in the period 
1986-2005. 
 Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of Lester’s Range for the EU-KLEMS and 
NBER-CES samples, in comparison with the UK firm-level samples. The results are 
consistent across samples and show a negative trend in rent sharing. The fall among 
the US manufacturing industries happened earlier, in the 1970-80s, than in Europe, 
which experienced a dramatic fall after the turn of the millennium. Finally, the 
difference in the level of the Lester range and change between the industry and firm-
level estimates, stems from the lower rent-sharing coefficients and smaller dispersion 
of profits at the industry level. 
 
VI. Changes in Rent Sharing, Market Power and Labour Share 
 
            The evidence considered so far shows that UK-domiciled companies share 
profits with workers, but much less so now than they used to. The same pattern 
emerges for industries in the US and nine EU countries. What has driven this decline?  
One consistent finding in the recent literature that is focused on the labour share has 
been the connection between the falling labour share and growing market 
concentration (Autor et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; 
Adrjan, 2018). This begs the question whether the observed decline in rent-sharing 
has been more pronounced among those firms with more market power. This section 
offers evidence on this question. 
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 To do so, the firm-level data are returned to with an aim to explore whether 
companies with high market power share more or less of their profits, and whether this 
has changed over time. Firm market share is the measure of market power that is 
considered. However, it is often unclear for global companies how to define their 
market of reference. For supermarket chains that are primarily domestically focused 
(e.g. Tesco) one could argue that the UK retail sector is an appropriate reference 
market, but for more global companies (e.g. British Petroleum or HSBC) one should 
arguably look at the worldwide market. In other words, taking the UK industry revenue 
or employment from EU-KLEMS could be a valid option for Tesco, but not for British 
Petroleum. A lack of information on the size of the global operation, generates a need 
to take an alternative approach and define the company’s reference market as the 
sample’s industry total. 
 Therefore, firm-level market share is the firm’s revenue or employment share 
in the sample’s industry total. A composite sample for the industry total is constructed, 
in order to ensure that changes in sample size do not drive the results. By construction, 
the size of the sample varies, implying larger industry total for years with more 
observations. Without correction this would then underestimate market share in the 
middle of the sample window and overestimate at the ends. To adjust for this, the 
approach taken in in Nickell (1996) is adopted. This imputes the number of ‘outside 
the top’ observations for all years using the sample composition from 1996-1999 
(when the sample size peaks). Second, owing to exclusion of companies which were 
within the top 300 for less than three years, the ends of the sample (1983-84 and 
2015-16) have less ‘at the top’ observations. These are imputed using the sample 
composition from 1985 and 2014 correspondingly.  
 Market share for company i from industry j at time t is: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
where the denominator 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the sum of revenue for 1-digit (2-digit for manufacturing) 
industry j at time t, calculated for the adjusted composite sample. The market share of 
employment can be computed analogously.  
 Figure 7 illustrates the growth of the median and the upper quartile of the 
market share measures since 1983. Market share exhibits a U-shaped evolution 
through time, which is especially visible for the 75th percentile, which dips in the early 
1990s and then peaks after the Great Recession. The median company in 1983 
earned and employed around 1.5% of its industry total revenue and employment. 
Thirty-three years later the median share had grown to 2%.  
 The same empirical strategy as for the earlier firm-level analysis is adopted, 
but, in addition, now exploring whether companies with higher market power share 
more or less of their profits. In particular, profits are interacted with the measure of 
market share in the  following way: 
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log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝜗𝜗𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 + �𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙log 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 +𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 The notation is as in Section IV. For the sake of brevity only the model with time 
fixed effects is reported (without the nation-wide unemployment rate). The model is 
estimated separately for the two sub-periods: 1983-2000 and 2001-2016.  
 Figure 8 displays the long-run rent-sharing coefficients calculated for different 
moments of the revenue-based market share distributions (i.e. the 10th, 25th, 75th and 
90th percentiles). Consistently across time periods, companies with high market power 
have on average higher rent sharing than companies with low power.10 However, the 
positive association between market power and rent sharing is significantly weaker in 
the period 2001-2016 compared to 1983-2001. In other words, the fall in rent sharing 
was more pronounced among the companies, which enjoy monopolistic markups. 
Virtually the same results are obtained using an employment-based measure of 
market power (available upon request). These results are at best indicative of the role 
of market power since the differences are not statistically significant and the measure 
of market power is imperfect, but suggests an interesting area for further research. 
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
            Recently, and particularly since real wage stagnation and the sluggish 
productivity performance of many countries have persisted in the wake of the financial 
crisis, many commentators have expressed concerns around not achieving inclusive 
growth. One key feature of inclusive growth that traditionally has been highlighted is 
whether or not companies share the gains from productivity and higher profits with 
workers. An older literature that typically utilised data from time periods before wage 
inequality started rising tended to emphasise that rent sharing was a key feature of 
the way in which worker bargaining power did in fact redistribute to wages. 
 This paper presents a range of evidence to show that the extent of rent sharing 
has declined very sharply over time. And that the decline is, if anything, more marked 
where firm market power has risen. This is the case for a specially constructed panel 
of UK publicly listed firms over the period 1983-2016, where the analysis shows that 
a significant and economically substantial role for profit sharing in wage determination 
                                                          
10
 A positive association between rent sharing and market power is also reported in Card et al. (2014).  
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in the 1980s and 1990s has vanished since around the start of the new millennium. A 
similar story holds for the EU and US, though the decline occurred earlier in the US. 
 These findings are important looking forward if a goal is to figure out the means 
by which inclusive growth can be generated in advanced countries. Rising firm 
markups, product market concentration and labour market concentration are all 
current trends that run counter to this and make it a challenging and difficult aim. 
Evidently, more needs to be done to better understand the ways that wage setting 
arrangements of modern corporations operating in a globalised world can be improved 
to raise productivity and to reward workers in a fair and equitable way at the same 
time. 
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Figure 1: The Number of Listings on the London Stock Exchange 
 
 
Notes: The black solid line denotes the total number of listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The black 
dashed line marks the number of listings, which are used to construct the top 300 sample represented by the grey 
line. See the text for more details on the sample construction. Source: LSPD, own calculations. 
 
Figure 2: Composition of the Top 300 Sample  
 
Notes: The grey line denotes the total number of companies in the top 300 sample. The black solid line marks the 
number of companies, which were within the top 300 in a given year. The black dashed line shows the number of 
companies, which were not within the top 300 in a given year, but were in the top for some other year between 
1983 and 2016. Source: LSPD, own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Mean Employment in the Top 300 Sample  
 
Notes: The graph presents the mean employment for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per 
employee (top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s construction based on various sources (see the text). 
 
Figure 4: Real Revenue, Compensation and Profit per Employee in the Top 300 Sample 
 
Notes: The graph presents the weighted mean of total revenue, compensation and profit before taxation per 
employee, deflated by the CPI. The data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee 
(top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s construction based on various sources (see the text). 
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Figure 5: Industry-Specific Changes in Rent Sharing  
 
Notes: Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, 
on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. 
Profits were instrumented using the industry-level leave-out means of profits. Each circle represents the estimated 
change between the two periods 2001-2016 and 1983-2000, the size of circle marks the average (across time) 
sector share in the total value added.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Evolution of the Lester Range 
 
Notes: For “Industry: US manufacturing” the periods 2000-2009 and 2009-2016 are the same and correspond to 
2000-2011. For “Industry: EU-KLEMS” the period 2009-2016 corresponds to 2009-2015. 
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Figure 7: Market Share  
 
Notes: The graph presents the evolution of the 75th (p75), median (p50) and 25th (p25) percentiles of market share. 
The black lines marks estimates based on revenue. The grey line marks estimates based on employment. Data is 
for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s 
construction based on various sources (see the text). 
 
Figure 8: Firm-Level Rent Sharing and Market Share of Revenue
 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per 
employee on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, market share of revenue, the interaction term 
between market share and profits, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. Three lags of all 
independent variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits (top/bottom 
1%). Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
III Working paper 29                                                                                                                                Bell, Bukowski and Machin 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
Table 1: Rankings of Companies in the Top 300 Sample 
  1983   2000   2016 
  Market Capitalization (in mln)   Market Capitalization (in mln)   Market Capitalization (in mln) 
1 British Petroleum  7421   Vodafone Group  158124   HSBC Holdings  130498 
2 General Electric Company 4888   British Petroleum  121844   British Petroleum  99236 
3 Imperial Chemical Industries 3880   GlaxoSmithKline  118910   British American Tobacco 86162 
4 Marks and Spencer Group 2830   HSBC Holdings  91284   GlaxoSmithKline  76695 
5 British American Tobacco 2631   AstraZeneca  59619   AstraZeneca  56137 
                  
  Employment   Employment   Employment 
1 British American Tobacco 187173   Unilever  295000   G4S  592897 
2 General Electric Company 170865   Anglo American  249000   Compass Group  527180 
3 Grand Metropolitan 136297   Sainsbury 185200   Tesco  464520 
4 British Petroleum  131600   HSBC Holdings  161624   HSBC Holdings  235175 
5 Unilever  127000   Tesco  152210   Sainsbury 181900 
                  
  Revenue (in mln)   Revenue (in mln)   Revenue (in mln) 
1 British Petroleum  32381   British Petroleum  97900   British Petroleum  136100 
2 Imperial Chemical Industries 8256   Aviva  40244   Legal and General Group 77969 
3 British American Tobacco 7904   HSBC Holdings  33182   Prudential 71842 
4 Barclays  7888   Unilever  28977   HSBC Holdings 60495 
5 National Westminster Bank  6605   Prudential  28078   Tesco 55917 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Year N Mean SD Min Max 
      
        
Employment 
1983 337 15104 25974 27 187173 
2000 413 14831 30645 22 295000 
2016 307 22939 59283 5 592897 
  
  
          
Compensation per Employee 
(in th £2016) 
1983 323 18.6 7.5 1.8 75.4 
2000 413 29.7 16.0 0.6 315.8 
2016 307 34.4 24.4 1.1 525.0 
  
  
          
Revenue per Employee (in th 
£2016) 
1983 333 124.4 119.6 11.4 4734.2 
2000 413 205.1 262.1 2.9 7958.4 
2016 307 216.9 458.1 0.0 9447.4 
  
  
          
Profit per Employee (in th 
£2016) 
1983 337 8.7 9.4 -0.1 408.4 
2000 413 17.4 30.7 -160.9 1092.2 
2016 307 11.7 33.5 -722.3 914.5 
  
            
              
 
Notes: Compensation, Revenue and Profit before taxation per employee are deflated by the CPI and expressed in 
£2016. The data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). 
Source: author’s construction based on various sources (see the text). 
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Table 3: Firm-Level Rent Sharing 1983-2016 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
                  
 
 
0.477*** 0.488*** 0.43*** -0.177*** 0.478*** 0.494*** 0.445*** -0.187*** 
  
(0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.028) 
 
 
0.006*** 0.008*** 0.01*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
- -0.002** -0.003 0 - -0.002* -0.003 0.001 
  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
 
- - 0.002 0 - - 0.002 0.001 
  
    (0.002) (0.001)     (0.002) (0.001) 
 
 
- - -0.001 -0.002** - - -0.001 -0.002** 
  
    (0.001) (0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 
0.004 -0.017 0.018 0.005 0 0.001 0.011 0.006 
  
(0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) 
 
 
- 0.045 -0.048 -0.021 - 0.005 0.003 -0.007 
  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.015)   (0.038) (0.036) (0.015) 
 
 
- - 0.11** 0.03 - - 0.102 0.004 
  
    (0.054) (0.019)     (0.074) (0.02) 
 
 
- - 0.014 0.074*** - - -0.054 0.039 
  
    (0.053) (0.025)     (0.07) (0.026) 
 
 
0.005 0.043*** -0.006 0.025* - - - - 
  
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)         
 
 
- -0.047*** -0.034 -0.029* - - - - 
  
  (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)         
 
 
- - 0.109*** 0.066*** - - - - 
  
    (0.024) (0.019)         
 
 
- - -0.124*** -0.048*** - - - - 
  
    (0.018) (0.016)         
                  
LR Coefficient 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.007 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.158 0.144 0.183 0.093 0.160 0.155 0.182 0.108 
                  
Firm-Years 11478 11380 9751 9751 11478 11380 9751 9751 
Firms 832 829 731 731 832 829 731 731 
Time Quad Quad Quad Quad Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) No Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) No 
                  
 
Notes: OLS (Columns 4 and 8) and Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log 
compensation per employee, on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry 
wages, the log unemployment rate and quadratic time trend (Columns 1-4) or year fixed effects (Columns 5-8). 
Various lags of all independent variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed 
profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Dependent Variable:  Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
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Table 4: The Evolution of Firm-Level Rent Sharing 
    
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
   
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
 
 
(8) 
 
 
(9) 
 
 
(10) 
 
  1983-
2000 
 
2001-
2016 
 
1983-
1991 
 
1991-
2000 
 
2000-
2009 
 
2009-
2016 
 
1983-
1991 
 
1991-
2000 
 
2000-
2009 
 
2009-
2016 
 
 
 
                    
  0.376*** 0.428*** 0.620*** 0.438*** 0.512*** 0.253*** 0.351* 0.359*** 0.597*** 0.265*** 
 
 
(0.086) (0.062) (0.161) (0.077) (0.057) (0.083) (0.183) (0.129) (0.085) (0.098) 
  0.017*** 0.01*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.013 0.033*** 0.008* 0.005 
 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
  0 -0.003 0.014 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.014 0.006 -0.006 0.007** 
 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.025) (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) 
  0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006* 0.002 -0.001 0.014 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008* 
 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.025) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
  0.006* -0.002* - - - - - - - - 
 
 
(0.003) (0.001)                 
  
-0.007 0.012 -0.136 -0.010 0.121* 0.006 -0.066 -0.021 0.039 0.018 
 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.106) (0.028) (0.066) (0.018) (0.057) (0.026) (0.070) (0.017) 
  0.077 0.002 0.184 0.152 0.118 0.001 -0.004 0.019 -0.039 -0.020 
 
 
(0.116) (0.038) (0.227) (0.136) (0.119) (0.033) (0.060) (0.028) (0.066) (0.026) 
  
-0.116 0.18* 0.000 -0.199 -0.140 0.198 -0.021 -0.030 -0.142 0.159* 
 
 
(0.116) (0.101) (0.210) (0.127) (0.140) (0.126) (0.037) (0.029) (0.086) (0.090) 
  
-0.04 -0.016 - - - - - - - - 
  
(0.099) (0.09)                 
                      
LR Coeff. 0.043 0.012 0.050 0.035 0.016 0.007 0.065 0.060 -0.003 0.006 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.042) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.053) (0.021) (0.028) (0.012) 
Lester R. 0.445 0.200 0.486 0.373 0.277 0.104 0.627 0.642 -0.056 0.095 
 
  
        
Firm-Years 4719 5032 1,901 3,748 3,437 2,474 1,897 3,748 3,437 2,474 
Firms 547 503 404 539 494 379 404 539 494 379 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Ind. Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
                      
 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per 
employee, on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages, and year fixed 
effects. Three (Columns 1-2) or two (Columns 3-10) lags of all independent variables are included. Data are for 
companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). In columns 1-6, profits are 
instrumented with their previous lags. In columns 7-10, profits are instrumented with the industry-level leave-out 
means. Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
Dependent Variable: Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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Table 5: Manufacturing Firm-Level Rent Sharing (Domestic Operation) 
 
  
 
Dependent Variable: Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
1983-2016 1983-2016 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2009 2009-2016 
 
 
            
  
0.372*** 0.370*** 0.466*** 0.365*** 0.174*** 0.239*** 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.04) (0.034) (0.062) (0.042) 
  
0.0150*** 0.0135*** 0.058** 0.042*** 0.014* 0.016 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.026) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) 
  0.0022 0.00251 -0.013 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.006) (0.022) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
  
-
0.00942*** 
-
0.00982*** -0.014** -0.021*** -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  0.00177 0.00159 0.006 0.003 0.012** -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
  0.446*** 0.0301 -1.209** 0.411 0.258 -1.286** 
 (0.167) (0.287) (0.598) (0.275) (0.472) (0.595) 
  
0.412*** 0.711** -0.865 1.257** -0.048 1.347 
 (0.389) (0.578) (1.43) (0.522) (0.846) (0.886) 
  
-0.185* 0.541* 4.073* 0.753 1.178 0.11 
 (0.361) (0.71) (2.103) (0.48) (0.95) (0.939) 
  0.155 -0.333 0.131 0.322 0.335 -1.026 
 (0.393) (0.639) (2.074) (0.477) (0.545) (1.073) 
  
-0.110*** -0.0631* -0.236*** 0.134 0.019 -0.169 
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.087) (0.103) (0.079) (0.127) 
  
0.0973*** -0.192** -0.522** -0.274 0.121 -0.107 
 (0.127) (0.113) (0.251) (0.197) (0.178) (0.183) 
  
0.0222 0.0361 0.337 -0.273 -0.207 0.476** 
 (0.153) (0.148) (0.307) (0.23) (0.194) (0.238) 
  
0.0525*** 0.0419 -0.115 0.182 0.155 -0.077 
 
(0.157) (0.121) (0.302) (0.192) (0.187) (0.156) 
             
LR Coefficient 0.015 0.012 0.069 0.037 0.033 0.007 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.054) (0.03) (0.015) (0.02) 
Lester Range 0.18 0.15 0.542 0.329 0.406 0.076 
              
Firm-Years 27250 27250 13,374 9,164 3,700 3,108 
Firms 2797 2797 2,058 1,606 841 619 
Time Quad Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
              
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on 
the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, log average regional wages, log regional unemployment rate and 
quadratic polynomial of time (Column 1)  or year fixed effects (Columns 2-6). Three lags of all independent variables are 
included. Data are for manufacturing companies from ARD and ABS, with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). 
Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
 
Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
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Table 6: Industry-Level Rent Sharing in the EU  
   
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
        
  
1991-2005 
 
 
0.0019*** 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0012*** 
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lester Range 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 
  
        
  
2005-2015 
 
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Lester Range 0 0 0 0 
  
        
          
Observations 255 255 255 255 
Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
          
 
Notes: The pooled OLS estimates from the industry-level regression of the 14-years (1991-2005) or 10-
years (2005-2015) change in log compensation per employee on the analogous change in log value added 
per employee, country fixed effects (Columns 2 and 5) and industry fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4), run 
separately for each period. The changes are calculated for the 3-years averages. Source: EU-KLEMS, 
own calculations. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
  
Dependent Variable: Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 - Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 
(𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2005 -  (𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1991 
(𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2015 -  (𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2005  
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Table 7: Industry-Level Rent Sharing in US Manufacturing  
     
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
1963-2011 1963-1974 1974-1983 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2011 
 
 
  
          
  
0.729*** 0.362*** 0.606*** 0.382*** 0.506*** 0.508*** 
 
 
(0.016) (0.044) (0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.031) 
  
0.005** 0.037*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
  
0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.010*** -0.005 0.001 
 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
  
-0.003 -0.010** -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.005* 
 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
  
0.001 0.009** -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
  
0.034*** 0.065*** 0.047* 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.008 
 
 
(0.008) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) 
  
0.025* 0.101** -0.004 0.039 0.030 0.006 
 
 
(0.012) (0.051) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.018) 
  
0.029* 0.082* 0.065 0.098*** 0.026 -0.033* 
 
 
(0.014) (0.050) (0.040) (0.029) (0.030) (0.018) 
  
0.064*** -0.027** 0.140*** 0.100*** 0.077*** 0.042** 
  
(0.009) (0.011) (0.033) (0.036) (0.026) (0.018) 
    
          
LR Coefficient 0.014 0.054 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.005 
  
(0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.082 0.174 0.045 0.064 0.019 0.032 
              
Industry-Years 21004 4590 4590 4130 4550 4972 
Industries 459 459 459 459 458 452 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
              
 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced industry-level regression of log compensation per employee, 
on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. Three lags 
of all independent variables are included. Data are from IPUMS-CPS March files and NBER-CES Manufacturing database. 
Standard errors clustered at industry level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Dependent Variable: Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
III Working paper 29                                                                Bell, Bukowski and Machin 
 
38 
 
 
 
Appendix 
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Table A1: The Evolution of Firm-Level Rent Sharing for Firms with Employment > 50. 
 
    
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
1983-2000 2001-2016 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2009 2009-2016 
  
            
 
  
 
0.389*** 0.434*** 0.622*** 0.410*** 0.486*** 0.269*** 
  
(0.084) (0.072) (0.160) (0.080) (0.060) (0.084) 
 
  
 
0.018*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.009** 0.007** 
  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
 
  
 
-0.004 -0.001 0.013 -0.007** -0.001 -0.000 
  
(0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
  
 
0.005 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.001 -0.002 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
  
 
0.004 -0.003**         
  
(0.003) (0.001)         
 
  
 
-0.007 0.005 -0.138 -0.005 0.156** 0.003 
  
(0.025) (0.021) (0.105) (0.028) (0.063) (0.018) 
 
  
 
0.088 0.015 0.184 0.128 0.074 0.005 
  
(0.118) (0.039) (0.227) (0.138) (0.118) (0.034) 
 
  
 
-0.174 0.142 0.000 -0.234* -0.071 0.141 
  
(0.119) (0.094) (0.209) (0.138) (0.118) (0.113) 
 
  
 
-0.023 0.043         
  
(0.097) (0.083)         
  
            
LR Coefficient 0.038 0.011 0.044 0.026 0.017 0.006 
  
(0.012) (0.004) (0.039) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.360 0.167 0.406 0.250 0.267 0.089 
  
    
        
Firm-Years 4,703 4,994 1,896 3,725 3,405 2,449 
Firms 542 497 403 532 486 375 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
              
      
        
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on 
the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages, and year fixed effects. Three (Columns 
1-2) or two (Columns 3-5) lags of all independent variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample, 
which average employment is larger than 50, with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Profits are instrumented 
with their previous lags. Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
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Dependent Variable: Log 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
𝜋𝜋/𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 
Log 𝑤𝑤�  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 
